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he European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is now eight years old. It was initiated in 
the wake of the 2004 enlargement of the EU with ten new member states, preceded 
months earlier by the Georgian ‘Rose Revolution’ and then followed some months 
later by the Ukrainian ‘Orange Revolution’. This seemed to be the EU’s hour of triumph, 
with the huge enlargement going alongside the signing of the Constitutional Treaty also in 
2004, following on from the successful launch of the euro in 2000.  
These major developments motivated the launching of the ENP as a complementary move, 
signalling that the EU would not be ignoring its new neighbours to its east, and on the 
contrary wanting to encourage them to converge on modern European values and economic 
standards. ‘Everything but the institutions’ was one of the slogans, advanced by Romano 
Prodi who was presiding over the European Commission until November 2004. Initially the 
ENP  was  conceived  to  support  the  three  new  direct  neighbours,  Belarus,  Ukraine  and 
Moldova.  Given  the  EU’s  permanent  balancing  act  between  its  northern  and  southern 
interests,  it  was  decided  to  extend  the  ENP  to the  southern  neighbours,  which  however 
meant  a  confusing  overlap  with  the  already  existing  Euro-Mediterranean  Policy  and  its 
Association Agreements. One consequence of this widening to the south Mediterranean was 
that the initial exclusion of the three south Caucasus states became a politically untenable 
proposition for EU foreign ministers, and so they were added. 
Expectations for the ENP saw contradictory narratives. Optimists were impressed by the 
colour revolutions, especially that of Ukraine whose hero Viktor Yushchenko had narrowly 
escaped assassination by poisoning, with the ‘gas princess’ Yulia Timoshenko co-starring as 
heroine.  Less  impressed  were  most  academics,  who  commented  that  without  EU 
membership  perspective  for  the  partner  states  there  was  unlikely  to  be  the  kind  of 
transformative impact suggested by official texts and many speeches. 
The Ukrainian Orange Revolution soon degenerated into chronic governance failure, leading 
to a virtual counter-revolution under President Yanukovich since February 2010, with Yulia 
Timoshenko imprisoned in order to remove this troublesome political competitor. She thus 
became Ukraine’s counterpart to Russia’s Mikhail Khodokorsky, imprisoned since 2005 as 
Putin sought to protect his regime against contagion from the colour revolutions. Georgia on 
the  other  hand  saw  a  very  impressive  economic  reform  programme,  although  President 
Saakashvili  became  increasingly  authoritarian.  Georgian  political  scientist,  Ghia  Nodia, 
warned already in early 2005 of the ‘banana republic’ model, whereby a coup d’etat removes a 
dictator in the name of democracy, only for the new leader to himself become a dictator, and 
so on to the next coup. However, in the Georgian case the next episode was instead war with 
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Russia, after Saakashvili responded to relentless provocation by Russia’s proxies in South 
Ossetia with his militarily catastrophic attack on Tskinvali in August 2008. President Sarkozy 
mediated  the  peace  to  end  Europe’s  first  inter-state  war  of  the  post-Soviet  period  with 
impressive speed and resolution.  
However  that  was  Sarkozy’s  best  moment,  while  one  of  the  worst  was  his  ill-conceived 
Mediterranean Union, initially proposed in 2007 to embrace only the northern and southern 
coastal states of the Mediterranean, and so exclude northern Europe and completely destroy 
the  ENP.  Chancellor  Merkel  put  her  foot  down,  insisting  that  there  could  be  no  such 
initiative that would be the prerogative of half the EU only, and by mid-2008 Sarkozy had 
given way. Still the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM, as it was renamed) amounted to a 
confusing overlap with the ENP. Its political aspects were spectacularly inappropriate in 
view of the underlying causes of the Arab Spring that was soon to follow: the UfM totally 
eschewed inconvenient political matters like the region’s repressive authoritarianism, with 
Sarkozy inviting President Mubarak to be his co-president.          
The failure of the colour revolutions, alongside the resilience of authoritarianism in the Arab 
world, Russia and China, led some commentators in the mid-2000s to write about ‘smart 
authoritarianism’ and the ‘backlash’ against the spread of democracy, as if this was the new 
global trend. But then in early 2011 the Arab Spring suddenly erupted. The EU’s erstwhile 
collaboration with the Arab autocracies, and refusal to have relations with democratically-
oriented Islamist parties, became instantly the subject of mea culpa declarations. For years 
officials of the EU institutions had wanted a more muscular human rights policy, coupled 
with opening of dialogue with moderate Islamist opposition parties. But foreign ministers 
for  the  EU’s  Mediterranean  member  states  ruled  this  out.      Now  the  discourse  changed 
drastically. There would be support not for any democracy, but for ‘deep democracy’, with 
the offer of ‘more for more’ as the slogan for more serious conditionality. France’s foreign 
minister, who had responded to the Tunisian uprising by kindly offering to President Ben 
Ali the help of the French police, was sacked.     
Yet the path to deep democracy is anything but a straight line. The long-term trend may well 
be an ineluctable tendency for populations in advanced economies with high educational 
standards  to  demand  political  participation.  But  in  the  meantime  the  European 
neighbourhood sees a wide proliferation of regime types, and notably so in the aftermath of 
revolutionary regime collapse. We should not forget the ‘great revolution’ model, with its 
impressive empirical record (France 1789, China 1911, Russia 1917, Iran 1979), where well-
intentioned  democrats  take  power  initially,  but  soon  get  swept  aside  by  ideological 
radicalization and reigns of terror, with new authoritarian regimes to last for decades. The 
European neighbourhood sees no dominant dynamic political model as of now, but rather a 
complete spectrum of regime types, ranging from the very gradual constitutionalization of 
some monarchies at one extreme through to the descent into civil war and the nightmare of 
the failed or failing state at the other extreme, or counter-revolution, or just shaky attempts 
to work with new democratic constitutions.  
The EU’s neighbourhood policy may not have an impressive transformative impact in any 
directly  observable  manner,  comparable  to  the  example  of  the  new  member  states  from 
Central and Eastern Europe. The conditionality mechanisms, so strong and comprehensive 
for accession candidates, are only a faint derivative, with incentives insufficient to drive the 
politics of the neighbouring states. Still it seems that a certain socialization process is at work. 
The civil societies of the eastern neighbours in particular, see European standards of human 
rights and democracy as the model. Moreover, the EU’s neighbourhood policy compares 
distinctly  favourably  with  other  attempts  at  regionalism  at  the  continental  level,  often 
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China  Sea  are  seen  to  be  threatening  to  the  other  states  of  the  region.  India  has  been 
recurrently on the brink of war with Pakistan, and the South Asia regional association lacks 
substance.  The  presence  of  the  United  States  in  the  Americas  is  so  huge  as  to  generate 
spasms of anti-Americanism, spurred on by some obviously aberrant examples like the Cuba 
policy imposed by Congress. Closest to home, Russia’s attempts to re-integrate the former 
Soviet space have all too often been pursued with the aid of coercive measures, or implicit 
threats of coercion. The EU is at peace with its neighbours and has a reasonably high level of 
trust with almost all of them. 
Moreover highly interesting opinion polls or surveys are now coming out of Russia and 
China, with special implications for their foreign policies in years to come. In Russia the 
young  elite  of  persons  interested  in  international  affairs  reject  the  current  nationalist 
realpolitik of the Kremlin, wanting instead something far closer to European thinking, and for 
their generation to feel and be seen as a normal part of Europe. In China a recent poll shows 
a majority disapproving of the stance of their country in alliance with Russia in the UN 
Security Council over Syria. Both Russian and Chinese regimes may not collapse soon, but 
the groundswell of political dissent grows.       
Yet,  the  EU’s  own  current  crisis  is  hitting  its  neighbours  hard  economically,  and 
undermining  its  reputation  as  a  model  for  regional  integration.  There  used  to  be talk  in 
Brussels of a bicycle theory of integration, according to which you have to keep moving to 
avoid  falling  off.  This  theory  fell  into  disrepute  as  the  single  market,  single  money  and 
constitutional treaty were deemed by some to have brought the EU to the level of a steady-
state system, not requiring any further radical integration steps. The setbacks in ratification 
of the Constitutional Treaty, leading to the Lisbon Treaty compromise, underlined the depth 
of the resistance to deeper integration. Yet now the monetary union is seen as needing a 
banking union, a fiscal union and a political union in order for it and the EU itself to survive. 
Furthermore, most economists add that there is no extant economic and monetary union 
among  advanced  economies  that  does  not  also  have  a  powerful  redistributive  function 
through the budget (otherwise known as a transfer union). The bicycle theory rides again. 
History indeed is not a straight line.    
 